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Abstract: Fine (1994) is widely thought to have refuted the simple modal account of essence, which takes 
the essential properties of a thing to be those it cannot exist without exemplifying. Yet a number of 
philosophers have suggested resuscitating the simple modal account by appealing to distinctions akin to the 
one Lewis (1983; 1986) draws between sparse and abundant properties, treating only those in the former 
class as candidates for essentiality. I argue that ‘sparse modalism’ succumbs to counterexamples similar to 
those originally posed by Fine, and fails to capture paradigmatic instances of essence involving abundant 
properties and relations. 
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1. The modal account of essence: simple vs. sparse 
  
In his contemporary classic “Essence and Modality”, Kit Fine (1994) is widely thought to have 
refuted the once-dominant view that the essential properties of an individual are simply those 
properties it must exemplify if it exists. According to Fine, every property that is essential to an 
individual is one it must exemplify if it exists—but not vice versa. For some properties satisfy what 
occurs to the right of the following ‘simple’ modal account, but not what occurs to the left:  
 
MP The simple modal account of essential properties  
A property, Φ, is essential to x =def. necessarily, if x exists, then x has Φ.1    
 
As counterexamples, Fine points to properties like (i) is such that there are infinitely many prime 
numbers, (ii) is distinct from the Eiffel Tower, and (iii) his most famous case, is a member of {Socrates}. 
Although all of these are properties that Socrates cannot exist without exemplifying, none intuitively 
                                                
1 Fine (1994) also criticizes two close cousins of (what I am calling) the simple modal account: one that claims that Φ 
is essential to x =def. necessarily, x has Φ (i.e., without conditionalizing on x’s existence), and another that claims that 
Φ is essential to x =def. necessarily, if x = x, then x has Φ (i.e., conditionalizing on x’s being identical to itself rather on 
x’s existence). Call these the unconditional and identity-conditional simple modal accounts, respectively. For 
simplicity’s sake, I focus on modifications to what could be called the existence-conditional simple modal account, 
although my arguments generalize to similarly modified versions of the other two.  
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concern his “nature” or “identity” (1994, p. 9). As Fine puts it, citing facts about how Socrates is 
related to things like the Eiffel Tower, the prime numbers, and {Socrates} does not help to “define” 
Socrates, at least not in the sense of specifying “what it is” to be the very individual he is (ibid. p. 2), 
and so MP does not specify what is sufficient for a property to be essential to him. Due to Fine’s 
influential critique, literature on the metaphysics of essence has largely moved on, either following 
him in treating the notion as reductively unanalyzable, or instead by exploring the viability of 
reductive accounts that either appeal to unfamiliar pieces of ideology or make use of non-standard 
modal notions (or both).2  
However, a number of philosophers have suggested that this retreat from the simple modal 
account has been too drastic, since one could restrict the class of properties eligible for essentiality in 
some way. For instance, Joseph Almog (2003), Michael Gorman (2005), and Fabrice Correia (2006) 
tentatively suggest the possibility of undermining Fine’s counterexamples by distinguishing between 
properties corresponding to “anything that can be said about a thing” no matter how “artificial”, as 
opposed to those properties that “really characterize” it (as Gorman puts it: 2005, pp. 278-9), 
restricting MP to the latter class. In a similar vein, Barbara Vetter, after noting that Fine’s putative 
counterexamples are “strange properties”, observes that MP seems to function perfectly well for 
“such more natural candidate properties as being human or being a philosopher”, and wonders 
whether Fine only establishes “the more modest conclusion that some naturalness restriction needs 
to be imposed on candidate properties for essentiality” (2009, p. 3). The challenge, of course, will be 
to show that this restriction is not an unprincipled one, does not itself presuppose the notion of 
essence, and that suitably clarified will classify non-essential yet necessary properties of Socrates like 
is a member of {Socrates} as “strange” and “artificial” in the relevant sense while classifying essential 
properties like is a human as “natural”, “real characteristics” of him—a “tricky task”, as Correia 
concedes (2006, fn. 2).  
Although Almog et al. neither develop this response to Fine’s counterexamples in detail nor 
explicitly endorse it, Sam Cowling (2013) and Nathan Wildman (2013) have independently 
proposed appealing to what David Lewis (1983; 1986) famously calls the distinction between the 
                                                
2 For example, see Brogaard and Salerno (2007), Correia (2007), and Zalta (2007). An exception to the trend is the 
account proposed by Della Rocca (1996), which appeals to standard modal notions, yet employs them in a more 
complicated way than in the simple modal account. Alternatives to the simple modal account that predate Fine’s 
article include Copi (1954), Barcan Marcus (1971), Dunn (1990), and Almog (1991).  
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sparse and abundant properties in order to clarify the distinction upon which the response rests. 
Rather than taking an essential property of a thing to be any property it cannot exist without 
exemplifying, Cowling and Wildman propose taking an essential property of a thing to be any sparse 
property it cannot exist without exemplifying:  
 
SPM The sparse modal account of essential properties  
A property, Φ, is essential to x =def. (i) necessarily, if x exists, then x has Φ and (ii) Φ is a 
sparse property.3 
   
As Cowling and Wildman both note, non-equivalent conceptions of what it is for a property to be 
sparse rather than abundant yield non-equivalent variants of SPM.4 For instance, under Lewis’s 
conception of the distinction, the sparse properties are all and only the fundamental (or “perfectly 
natural”) properties, which collectively share the following characteristics:   
 
[s]haring of them makes for qualitative similarity, they carve at the joints, they are intrinsic, they are highly 
specific, the sets of their instances are ipso facto not entirely miscellaneous, there are only enough of them to 
characterize things completely and without redundancy. (Lewis 1986, p. 59)  
 
Lewis contrasts these with the abundant properties, which    
 
[…] may be as extrinsic, as gruesomely gerrymandered, as miscellaneously disjunctive as you please. They pay 
no heed to the qualitative joints, but carve things up every which way. […] There is one of them for any 
condition we could write down, even if we could write an infinite length and even if we could name all those 
things that remain nameless because they fall outside our acquaintance. (Lewis 1986. pp. 59-60)  
 
                                                
3 Terminological note: in Cowling’s article, “essential property” is used to describe any property that satisfies the 
right-hand side MP, while any property that satisfies the right-hand side of SPM is said to “lie within the nature” of 
the relevant individual. So strictly speaking, Cowling does not intend to offer SPM as an account of what he calls 
“essential properties”, and grants that being a member of {Socrates}, etc. are all (what he calls) essential properties of 
Socrates. Nonetheless, Cowling does intend to offer SPM as an account of what Fine calls “essential properties”, and 
denies that being a member of {Socrates}, etc. lie within Socrates’s nature for the very same reasons that Fine denies 
that they are (what Fine calls) essential properties of Socrates. To make matters simple, I will stick to using “essential 
property” in Fine’s sense throughout, although one can substitute in Cowling’s preferred expression where relevant.   
4 I will continue to speak as though the sparse and abundant properties are non-overlapping classes. Those who 
instead take the sparse properties to be a proper subset of the abundant properties can substitute “non-sparse 
abundant properties” whenever I say “abundant properties” throughout.    
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Call this fundamentalist SPM. One obvious worry with this variant of SPM is that it yields a 
criterion that seems far too narrow—certainly more narrow than the “natural” properties “really 
characterizing” a thing that Almog et al. allude to. Presumably, is a human is a biological property, 
and therefore not a fundamental one; hence fundamentalist SPM would entail that Socrates is not 
essentially human. Cowling and Wildman note that those worried with this consequence could 
instead opt for what Jonathan Schaffer (2004) calls the scientific conception of sparsity. As Wildman 
puts it, the sparse properties under this conception are any “involved in the total scientific 
understanding of the world, regardless of level of occurrence” (2013, p. 766). Call SPM interpreted 
under this broader conception of sparsity scientific SPM.5  
  Cowling and Wildman claim that relational properties like being a member of {Socrates} are 
not sparse under either conceptions, and thus conclude that the relational properties Fine cites 
against MP pose no difficulty for SPM (cf. Cowling 2013, p. 259; Wildman pp. 767 and 770-4). So 
far, so good—but the problem now is that the account overgeneralizes, ruling out cases in which it 
seems to be essential to a thing how it is related to other particular things (such as its being essential 
to {Socrates} to have Socrates as a member), and which it seems to be essential to a thing how it is 
related to some or other things of a particular kind (such as its being essential to Socrates that he 
originated from some gametes, though none in particular, to borrow a case from Wildman: 2013, p. 
773). Rather than ruling out all such essentialist judgments wholesale, Wildman treats them not as 
ascribing an abundant relational property to a thing, but rather as ascribing a sparse relation between 
that thing and others (in particular or of a particular kind). Wildman thus proposes the following 
supplement to SPM, which takes a thing to be essentially thus-and-so related just in case (i) the 
relation at issue is a sparse one and (ii) the thing in question cannot exist without also being thus-
and-so related (cf. pp. 772-3):       
                                                
5 A third conception worth mentioning is inspired by Denby (2014), who argues that Φ is an essential property of x 
=def. (i) necessarily, if x exists, x has Φ and (ii) Φ is an intrinsic property of x, which roughly has to do with whether 
“its instantiation is insensitive to the state or nature of anything other than its instances” (ibid., p. 91). Since not 
every intrinsic property is fundamental (e.g., is made of tin), and not every property described in science is intrinsic 
(e.g., is a human, arguably; see fn. 13), construing the sparse/abundant divide in terms of the intrinsic/extrinsic 
divide yields a third variant of SPM that differs from the two that Cowling and Wildman discuss. Call this 
intrinsicality SPM. Alternatively, one could treat this not as a version of sparse modalism, but rather as a rival way 
of understanding what it is for a property to “really characterize” a individual (or to not be “strange”, “artificial”, 
and so on), and thus as a rival way of restricting the class of properties eligible for essentiality. Although I will 
continue to focus on fundamentalist and scientific SPM, at points I briefly explain how my arguments extend to 
modifications of the simple modal account that replace “sparse” with “intrinsic” (see fn. 10 and 13).    
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SRM The sparse modal account of essential relations  
  a. It is essential to x that it bears Ψ to y =def. (i) necessarily, if x exists, then Ψ holds of the 
ordered pair <x, y> and (ii) Ψ is a sparse relation. 
  b. It is essential to x that it bears Ψ to something that has Φ =def. (i) necessarily, if x exists, 
then there is some y that has Φ and is such that Ψ holds of the ordered pair <x, y> and 
(ii) Ψ is a sparse relation.6 
 
By appealing to SRM, one can accommodate instances of essence involving relations that SPM 
overlooks. Following Wildman—and purely for sake of argument—assume that the relation has ___ 
as member described in set theory and the relation originates from described in biology are both sparse 
relations, at least when sparsity is conceived of scientifically (2013, pp. 776 and 773 respectively).7 
And following Wildman—and again purely for sake of argument—also assume that {Socrates} 
cannot exist unless it has Socrates as a member, and assume that Socrates cannot exist unless he 
originated from some gametes (although none in particular).8 Then given these assumptions, one can 
capture the intuitive essentialist judgment that {Socrates} essentially have Socrates as a member 
(understood as ascribing the relation has ___ as a member rather than the relational property has 
Socrates as a member) as well as the intuitive essentialist judgment that Socrates originated from some 
gametes (understood as ascribing the relation originated from to some gametes rather than the 
relational property originated from some gametes).     
  Following Wildman, call the conjunction of SPM and SRM sparse modalism (specifying 
whether it is the fundamentalist or scientific strand when the context warrants). Sparse modalism 
summarized, I will spend the remainder of this paper arguing that it is no improvement over the 
simple modal account that it is intended to replace—and moreover, in at least one respect it does 
                                                
6 SRM is phrased differently in ‘Modality, Sparsity, and Essence’, but Wildman confirms this reading as faithful in 
personal communication.  
7 It is typically a matter of controversy whether a property or relation is sparse under either conception, and (as an 
anonymous referee rightly points out) one might take issue in a number of ways with classifying these relations as 
sparse in particular. Nonetheless I assume that they are in what follows since (i) if they are not, then SRM cannot 
even accommodate the intuitive essentialist judgments Wildman claims it can and (ii) I will eventually show that no 
matter which relations one takes to be sparse, my objections to sparse modalism go through.        
8 Here again (see the previous footnote), one may take issue with these assumptions—e.g., Dorr (2008) questions 
whether sets exist, while Rosen (2006) questions whether sets must exist whenever all their members do—but I 
again grant them as friendly concessions and because my objections to sparse modalism do not hinge on them. 
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worse. Sparse modalism is not an improvement over MP because it is subject to variants of the 
counterexamples Fine used to refute MP. And sparse modalism does worse than MP because in 
addition to failing to specify what is sufficient for a property to be had essentially, unlike MP it also 
fails to specify what is necessary, since it cannot accommodate paradigmatic instances of essence 
involving abundant properties and relations.  
    
2. Sparse modalism does not specify what is sufficient for being an essential property 
 
Here is a representative illustration of the problem. Recall that to capture the basic essentialist 
judgment that {Socrates} essentially has Socrates as a member, the sparse modalist must claim both 
that the relation has ___ as a member is a sparse one and that {Socrates} cannot exist unless it has 
Socrates as a member. But now let ΦPRIME be the conjunctive (and presumably abundant) property: 
 
  x has ΦPRIME =def. x is Socrates and is such that there are infinitely many prime numbers.   
 
Since {Socrates} cannot exist without having Socrates as a member, and cannot exist unless there are 
infinitely many prime numbers—trivially, since they necessarily exist—it follows that {Socrates} 
cannot exist unless it has something as a member that is both Socrates and is such that there are 
infinitely many prime numbers. So given condition (b) of SRM, it follows that it is essential to 
{Socrates} that it have something as a member that is Socrates and is such that there are infinitely 
many prime numbers. The problem, of course, is that this is precisely the kind of counterexample 
that Fine originally raised for simple modalism, and which sparse modalism was supposed to avoid. 
Citing facts about how {Socrates} is related to the prime numbers no more helps define {Socrates} or 
helps specify what it is to be the very thing it is than it does Socrates. SRM, just like MP, entails 
otherwise. Hence SRM is no advance over MP (at least along the dimension that the sparse modalist 
intends it to be). 
  An immediate response would be to claim that has ___ as a member of is not a sparse relation 
after all. In fact, although Wildman explicitly claims that it is (2013, p. 777), his method of 
handling one of Fine’s key counterexamples to simple modalism within the sparse modalist 
framework directly entails the non-sparsity of this relation. According to Wildman, SRM is able to 
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accommodate the basic essentialist judgment that it is not essential to Socrates to be distinct from 
the Eiffel Tower because is distinct from is an internal relation, and Wildman claims that internal 
relations are not sparse (ibid. p. 773-4). Yet similarly, since is a member of is an internal relation in 
the sense that Wildman has in mind—a non-empty set and its members cannot exist without the 
latter being members of the former—by Wildman’s own reasoning it would also follow that is a 
member of is not a sparse relation either. As well, the non-sparsity of has ___ as a member is also 
suggested by Cowling, who tentatively suggests the more general claim that “abstract objects are 
distinguished from concrete objects precisely because they lack natures”, insofar as “they bear no 
sparse properties” (2013, fn. 30). One would think would also be true of the relations they bear, in 
particular set-theoretic relations like as has ____ as a member. Thus anyone attracted to Cowling 
tentative thesis about what distinguishes abstract from concrete objects will face pressure to reject 
that has ___ as a member is a sparse relation.  
  There are two replies to make to this response. The first is that to deny that non-empty sets 
essentially have certain individuals as members (either because one keeps SRM but rejects that has 
___ as a member is a sparse relation, or because—even more radically—one rejects SRM or that 
abstract objects have essential natures) seems far too great a departure from the Finean conception of 
essence under consideration, and that the sparse modalist aims to capture.9  If the sparse modalist is 
unable to capture the basic essentialist intuition that it be essential to {Socrates} to have Socrates as a 
member, then the sparse modalist seems unsuccessful at stating what is necessary for essentiality. (I 
will return to this issue in section 3.)  
  The second reply is that one can replicate the problem with any individual whatsoever, so 
long as it cannot exist without bearing some sparse relation to something else (or perhaps itself). For 
instance, take two other basic essentialist judgments concerning something that is clearly not an 
abstract object: namely, that any particular water molecule essentially have an oxygen atom as a 
part.10  Let Φ*PRIME be the conjunctive (and presumably abundant) property: 
 
                                                
9 Linnebo (2008) offers further argument; for dissent, see Denby (2014).  
10 Among many others, Lowe (2008) and Koslicki (2012) take facts about the internal constitution of chemical 
substances to be among the facts about their essential nature.   
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x has Φ*PRIME =def. x is an oxygen molecule and is such that there are infinitely many prime 
numbers.   
 
Supposing that has ___ as a part is a sparse relation, one can reason as before that SRM entails, 
incorrectly, that it is essential to any particular water molecule that it have as a part something that is 
an oxygen molecule and is such that there are infinitely many prime numbers. Now of course, once 
again one might resist by claiming that has ___ as a part is not a sparse relation. Even if we ignore the 
fact that many maintain otherwise,11 the basic problem still remains: one can replicate the same 
reasoning with any of the many other cases in which it seems essential to a concrete thing that it bear 
a given relation Ψ to something that has a given property Φ. (I provide further examples in section 
3.) For in any such case, the relevant thing also cannot exist unless it bears Ψ to something that has 
the conjunctive property is Φ and is such that there are infinitely many prime numbers, and so 
condition (b) of SRM will incorrectly embed the prime numbers into its essence, just as the simple 
modal account does.     
  A more promising method of response would be to somehow qualify SRM—for instance, by 
restricting the generic condition Φ that occurs within it so that properties such as ΦPRIME and Φ*PRIME 
are excluded. That would block the line of argument presented just above. But the only obvious 
modifications—I can think of three—are all non-starters. First, one might respond that Φ be 
restricted to properties that are logical complexes of sparse properties and relations. To see why this 
will not do, first note that the sparse modalist should at least let is an oxygen atom and is a human be 
sparse properties (for if not, then the proposed modification would fail to count it as essential to any 
particular water molecule that it has an oxygen atom as a part, and would fail to count it as essential 
to Socrates that he be human). Let ΦHUMAN be the disjunctive property is either an oxygen molecule or a 
human. Since ΦHUMAN is a logical complex of sparse properties, the proposed modification would 
entail that it is essential to any particular water molecule that it has either an oxygen atom or a 
human as a part. But presumably, just as there is nothing in the essential nature of this water 
molecule that connects it to the prime numbers (to paraphrase Fine’s turn of phrase: 1994, p. 5), 
                                                
11 Eddon (manuscript), for instance, argues that parthood is a perfectly natural relation, which is presumably sufficient 
for it to be sparse under the fundamentalist conception (given that every perfectly natural relation is a fundamental 
relation on this conception) and the scientific conception (given that every fundamental relation will presumably be 
involved in our total scientific understanding of the world).   
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nothing in its essential nature connects it to humans either. Yet the proposed modification to SRM 
entails otherwise. 
  Second, one might respond that not only the relation Ψ but also the generic condition Φ be 
sparse in order for a thing to be essentially related by Ψ to something that is Φ. Although this 
proposal excludes such properties as ΦPRIME, Φ*PRIME, and ΦHUMAN, it also excludes a number of 
paradigmatic cases of essential relatedness. For instance, it would entail that it is not essential to the 
set {Socrates, Plato} that it have as a member something that either Socrates or Plato, and not 
essential to any particular water molecule that it has as a part something that is either an oxygen 
atom or a hydrogen atom as a part, given that disjunctive properties like being either Socrates or Plato 
and being either an oxygen atom or a hydrogen atom are paradigmatically abundant under both the 
fundamentalist and scientific conceptions of sparsity. (I provide further examples of this sort in 
section 3.) Hence this modification to SRM will not do either.  
  A final, even sharper departure from SRM goes as follows. Recall that SRM states that if it is 
essential to x to bear Ψ to some y that is Φ, then Ψ must be a sparse relation. The proposed 
modification instead requires that the conjunctive relation λxy(Φy & Ψxy) be a sparse relation. An 
added theoretical benefit of the proposed modification of SRM is that its logical form is more in line 
with the sparse modalist’s treatment of monadic properties, SPM.12 Yet this modification does no 
better than the previous one: if being identical to either Socrates or Plato is not a sparse property, for 
instance, then the result of conjunctively combining it with a relation (even a sparse relation) would 
presumably fail to be sparse too. Hence just like the previous modification, the one under 
consideration produces false negatives.13   
    
3. Sparse modalism does not specify what is necessary to being an essential property 
 
Thus far I have only argued that sparse modalism fails to adequately capture what is sufficient for 
essentiality. To see why it also fails to adequately capture what is necessary, it suffices to show that 
                                                
12 Alessandro Torza proposed this further modification to SRM.       
13 Replacing “sparse” with “intrinsic” in SRM (see fn. 5) also does not work, since it produces false positives.  Suppose, 
as seems plausible, that is set with infinitely many members is intrinsic to any set containing the prime numbers as 
members. Since is a member of is presumably an intrinsic relation between Socrates and any set with Socrates and the 
prime numbers as members, and since is a set with infinitely many members is an intrinsic property of such a set, then 
replacing “sparse” with “intrinsic” in SRM implies, incorrectly, that it is essential to Socrates that he be a member of 
a set that has infinitely many members.  
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there are cases in which an individual has one or more abundant properties essentially, or stands in 
one or more abundant relationships—and such cases seem commonplace. Take, for instance, human 
artifacts like the Eiffel Tower, which essentially exemplifies various abundant properties (e.g., being a 
tower14) and essentially stand in abundant relations (e.g., the relation was designed and constructed to 
perform such-and-such function by, which it bears to some engineer or other, or perhaps to Gustave 
Eiffel in particular).15 Similarly goes for entities such as smiles (the essential nature which includes 
facts about faces), holes (the essential nature of which includes facts about perforated surfaces), 
tropes (the essential nature of which includes facts about the particular thing it ‘inheres’ in), and 
events (the essential nature of which include facts about the objects, properties and times that 
‘participate’ in it) among others. 16  Clearly, properties and relations such as these are neither 
fundamental nor are they involved our total scientific understanding of the world, and therefore 
sparse under neither the fundamentalist or scientific conceptions of sparsity, respectively. And yet 
these are commonly treated as basic essentialist judgments, which the sparse modalist aims to 
capture, if any are. 
  A tempting response floated by Cowling is to appeal to some kind of deflationism about 
human artifacts (2013, fn. 37), which might extend to smiles, holes, tropes, events and so on. Yet 
even a deflationary conception of such things—at least one that is not outright and implausibly 
eliminativist rather than deflationist—would take them, even if conceived of in a deflationary way, to 
have at least some abundant properties essentially, if only category-level properties like is human 
artifact, or is a deflationary object. Even a deflationary conception of human artifacts attempts to state 
what the Eiffel Tower is in terms of such properties and relations, and therefore such properties 
should still be included in the Eiffel Tower’s essential nature under the Finean conception of essence 
at issue, their status as abundant notwithstanding.  
  Even setting this difficulty aside, the response under consideration would force one to take a 
deflationist attitude towards many other things that have abundant properties essentially and 
                                                
14 Compare Schaffer (2004, p. 94), who takes is a kazoo as an exemplar abundant property under the scientific 
conception of the sparse/abundant distinction.     
15 See, e.g., Elder (2004, pp. 131-62).  
16 Koslicki (2012) offers these as paradigmatic examples of ontological dependence, which she takes to entail 
corresponding claims about the essential natural of the ontologically dependent thing at issue. However, I take these 
to be paradigmatic examples of the essential properties of things regardless of whether one acknowledges this link 
between ontological dependence and essence.   
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essentially stand in abundant relations. This includes, but is not limited to, such things as 
propositions (since it is essential to the proposition <the Eiffel Tower is a tower> that it is true iff the 
Eiffel Tower is a tower) and properties (since it is essential to the property is a tower that it is an 
abundant property, and that something has it iff that thing is a tower). These are plainly not 
incidental features of properties and propositions: they pertain to the very nature of these things that 
any adequate philosophical account of what they are must accommodate and illuminate. Part of 
what it is to be the property being a tower is that it is an abundant property, for example, and part of 
what characteristically differentiates it from other abundant properties is that a thing exemplifies it 
just in case it is a tower. A thing would not be the very property is a tower is if it were either not a 
property or not exemplified just when something is a tower. It would be ad hoc to simply reject 
these cases: essentialist-framed judgments about such cases as these are nearly as strong and prevalent 
as those the sparse modalist wants to preserve. Sparse modalism would lose much of its motivation—
to capture the notion of essence that Fine and others are interested in wholly in terms of facts about 
modality and sparsity, but without rejecting basic essentialist intuitions en masse—if it were unable 
to capture them.17 
  Moreover, problems multiply further when one queries whether facts about identity and 
distinctness are included in the essences of things.18 Recall from section 3 that Wildman’s sparse 
modalist denies that internal relations in general, and the relation of distinctness in particular, are 
sparse relations: otherwise SRM wrongly entails that it is essential to Socrates to be distinct from 
{Socrates). But the identity relation is internal too; thus applying this strategy across the board would 
                                                
17 Matters are even worse is “sparse” is exchanged for “intrinsic” in SPM and SRM (see fn. 5). It iss widely held that 
membership in a given biological kind is an extrinsic property: for example, Sutton (2012, pp. 723-727) argues that 
this follows from the three most popular accounts of species in the current literature. So if “sparse” is exchanged for 
“intrinsic” in SPM and SRM, then the result entails, wrongly, that it is not even essential to Socrates that he is 
human.     
18 Fine (1995, p. 54) and Correia (2005, p. 32), for instance, both take assume this as a basic essentialist judgment. 
Although Denby argues that haecceitistic properties like being identical to Socrates are not essential properties (2014, 
pp. 28), his arguments do not extend in any obvious way to my claim here, which is that the relation of identity is 
one that Socrates essentially bears to himself. Unlike is identical to Socrates, the relation of identity is not “tied to any 
specific individual” (ibid., fn. 26) either by its nature or in its instantiation profile, seems to be indispensible to our 
total understanding of the world and arguably perfectly natural (c.f. Sider 2011, pp. 216-217), and we can have 
“intuitive insight” (ibid., p. 98) into how it is distributed. So even if failing to have these features is a reason to reject 
that being identical to Socrates is essential to Socrates (although it should be noted that Denby does not explain why 
they would be), the relation of being identical to arguably possesses these features, and so no reason has been given 
for denying that Socrates essentially bears this relation to himself.  
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preclude Socrates from being essentially identical to himself.19 Even if identity is allowed to be a 
sparse relation despite also being internal, pressure remains to allow distinctness be one too. As Fine 
notes, we make basic essentialist judgments not only about the individual things, but also about 
pluralities of things—including, but not limited to, the judgment that Socrates and {Socrates} are 
essentially distinct (c.f. 1995, p. 54). The most natural way to modify SRM is to say that this holds 
just in case distinctness is a sparse relation, one that Socrates and {Socrates} cannot both exist 
without exemplifying. Although this allows the sparse modalist to say that it is essential to Socrates 
and {Socrates} together to be distinct, the sparse modalist is once again committed to saying that it is 
essential to Socrates alone that he is distinct from {Socrates}. The sparsity of distinctness allows her to 
capture the first basic essentialist judgment, but only by forcing her to flout the second.  
  I provided a number of apparent cases of essence in abundance. But appearances could be 
deceiving, of course. Can the sparse modalist offer any general reason for believing that sparsity and 
essentiality go hand in hand, contrary to our intuitive judgments in the cases above? In fact, 
Wildman offers such an argument (2013, p. 764). According to Wildman, an essential property P of 
a individual, o must be “metaphysically significant” to o, in the sense that P “plays a role in 
determining what o is” (ibid., p. 764). Wildman’s claim is of course undeniable, given that Fine 
stipulates that by “essential properties” he just means to refer to the properties of an individual that 
play this individuative role (cf. 1994, p. 2). Rather, what is problematic is Wildman’s further claim 
that if the essential properties of an individual play this role, it follows that P must be a sparse 
property. According to Wildman, if P is metaphysically significant, then the following must hold: 
  
[…] any attempt to characterise the actual world without citing P would not fully determine what o is and 
would therefore be incomplete. As such, P is required to characterise things completely and without 
redundancy. And, since the sparse properties are those properties which characterise things completely and 
without redundancy, P must then be sparse.  
 
There are serious problems with Wildman’s argument. The first problem is that it is only under the 
narrow, Lewis-inspired fundamentalist conception of sparsity that a given sparse property is required 
in order to characterize things completely and without redundancy. But it is only if the sparse 
modalist opts for the broader, Schaffer-inspired scientific conception of sparsity that she is able to 
                                                
19 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me to explore this issue further.      
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capture basic essentialist judgments such as that Socrates essentially be human. Since Wildman’s 
argument presupposes the narrower conception of sparsity that precludes judgments such as these, it 
makes matters worse by diverging even further from the Finean conception of essence at issue.   
  The second problem is that even if an abundant property plays a role in determining what 
some individual is, it does not follow that one must cite that property in order to characterize things 
completely and without redundancy. For this abundant property can play a redundant role in 
determining what some individual is. Since the total pattern of distribution of sparse properties and 
relations fully determines how all things are, this total pattern also fully determines what the Eiffel 
Tower is in particular—namely, a tower. Thus even the abundant property is a tower must play a 
role in determining what the Eiffel Tower if essential to it, one need only cite the sparse properties 
and relations in order to characterize things completely and without redundancy, as these alone fully 
determine what it is—namely, a tower. Since Wildman’s argument relies on invalidly inferring 
otherwise, it provides no good reason to reject what I have maintained in this section: that the 
essential properties and relations exemplified by things can also be abundant.   
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Sparse modalism does not succeed in improving on the simple modal account of essence refuted by 
Fine. Just like the simple modal account, sparse modalism fails to specify what is sufficient for 
essentiality, and for precisely the same reason: both modal accounts bring irrelevant things and kinds 
into the essences of individuals. However, unlike the modal account, sparse modalism also fails to 
specify what is necessary for essentiality: individuals can have abundant properties essentially, and 
can essentially stand in abundant relationships. Lewis noticed many important tasks that the 
distinction between sparse and abundant properties can be put to in metaphysical theorizing. 
Resuscitating the simple modal account of essence—at least in the manner that I have considered at 
length in this article—does not appear to be one of them.20   
 
                                                
20 My thanks to Pablo Carnino, Fabrice Correia, Sam Cowling, Dana Goswick, Ghislain Guigon, Robert Michels, 
Kevin Mulligan, Jan Plate, Maria Scarpati, Tuomas Tahko, Nathan Wildman, Justin Zylstra, and anonymous 
referees for Canadian Journal of Philosophy for their helpful comments and kind encouragement. This article was 
written in large part while funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation as a member of the research project 
“The Nature of Existence: Neglected Questions at the Foundations of Ontology” (10012_150289), and I am 
grateful for its generous support.  
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